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Abstract 
 
      Using a panel dataset of bilateral flows of banking sector foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in developed and developing countries, we study the impact of regional integration 
agreements (RIAs) on the location of banking sector FDI. The results indicate that the impact 
of RIAs vary depending on different kinds of regional integration. The response to 
integration between developed countries (North-North integration) may differ from the 
response to integration between developing countries (South-South integration) or to an 
agreement between countries at different levels of development (North-South integration), 
depending on the significance and nature of environmental change brought about by the 
RIAs, the locational advantage of the country or region and the degree of integration at the 
outset. The RIAs between developed countries had relatively little influence on foreign bank 
entry, since much of the financial service trade between the member countries had been 
liberalized long before the agreement was established. By contrast, North-South integration 
agreements and South-South integration agreements brought about significant region’s policy 
environment changes and more proximity institutional, which suggests that they may have a 
notable (although varying) impact on banking sector FDI in the member countries.  
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Introduction 
 
        The 1990s witnessed a spread of Regional Integration Agreements (RIAs), including 
many between developing countries. Among the newly created RIAs are MERCOSUR, 
ASEAN, NAFTA, and the Cross-Border Initiative. Existing RIAs have also been revived and 
have increased their membership. Many developing countries are in an RIA or are discussing 
the possibility. Although some integration agreements have been motivated by political 
considerations, it is clear that economics is generally the driving force: countries enter into 
RIAs because integration promises various economic benefits. In the short run, integration is 
expected to stimulate intra-regional trade and investment; in the longer run, it is hoped that 
the combination of larger markets, tougher competition, more efficient resource allocation, 
and various positive externalities will raise the growth rates of the participating economies. 
 
        At the same time, the world has been experiencing a dramatic surge in FDI which 
involves flows toward both developed and developing countries. 
 
        In light of these developments, the role of regional integration agreements as a 
determinant of the location of FDI has become an increasingly relevant issue for developed 
and developing countries. It has been explored in a myriad of theoretical and empirical 
papers by trade economists who analyse both the rational of regionalism and his possible 
implications.  
         Since the impressive increase in FDI was largely driven by increases in FDI in services, 
and in particular financial FDI (FFDI), finance economists have been producing an 
impressive amount of work on the causes and implications of the internationalization of the 
banking Sector. The existing literature on foreign bank entry discusses the following factors 
as potential drivers of foreign bank participation: (a) banks’ desire to service their customers 
abroad– the so called “follow the clients” motive, (b) host-specific factors including market 
opportunities and regulatory barriers and (c) economic and cultural ties and institutional and 
regulatory similarities between home and host countries2. 
 
        These two branches of existing literature, however, have never met. The large studies 
that approach the question of location of foreign banks shows a substantial evidence that 
these micro and macro factors influence the decision of banks to operate overseas. Contrary 
to the wealth of evidence on these determinants, the role that Regional Integration 
Agreements (RIAs) and his type can play in bringing about foreign bank participation has not 
been discussed. Similarly among the studies of regionalism there is a large literature on the 
costs and benefits of Regional Integration Agreements on trade in goods and real FDI, and 
hardly any analysis of the implications of such agreement in services. This is surprising 
because nearly every major RIAs now has a services dimension. 
        The attraction of FFDI in the emerging markets was seen by policymakers as beneficial 
to the global financial system. The arguments in principal resemble those in favour of real 
                                                
2 See for example Claessens et. al. (1998) Focarelli,D.,  F. Pozzolo (2000) and Cull. R (2007) for cross section studies on Foreign Bank 
location 
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FDI. FFDI can be expected to contribute to the efficiency of host country financial systems 
through technology transfer and heightened competition. Entry by foreign bank, well 
capitalised institutions with sophistical risk management was also viewed as beneficial for 
financial stability. Moreover, banking sector FDI was expected to be a source of non-debt 
external financing for countries emerging from periods of economic and financial 
disturbances. 
         In this way and as in the realm of trade and FDI in goods, FFDI liberalization may, and 
has been pursued unilaterally or on a preferential basis. The purpose of this paper is to 
approach the issue of the role of RIAs as a determinant of the location of foreign banks from 
a theoretical and empirical point of view. A difficulty in assessing this role is that there are 
many channels through which RIAs could potentially have an impact on the banking FDI3. 
For these reasons, we will focus on how the type of RIA will affect its impact on the location 
of foreign banking investment and we will attempt to cover several different integration types 
by three case studies in the empirical part of the paper. 
This communication will be articulated around three essential points: 
 
1- Beyond the traditionally advanced theoretical justifications, we make the assumption that 
the impact of these agreements on flows of IDE depends on the level of development and the 
institutional proximity between country of origin and host country. It is because these 
agreements impose to the partners a certain number of reforms and levellings institutional 
and organisational which they can influence flows of FDI. If quantitative variables such that 
the size of the market and its growth rate, the labour available, its cost, its qualifications hope 
in the decision to be established abroad, in the case of services and particularly in the case of 
financial services, it is especially the control of the contractual variables which validate this 
decision and explain the passage to the act. The foreign investors require being reassured on 
the extent of the protection that ensures them the agreements between their country of origin 
and the host country. This built institutional proximity causes to reduce the risks related to 
the establishment in foreign countries. The countries transmitting IDE export their standards 
thus.  
 
2- To undertake a study of the tendency of FFDI, it is essential to examine the institutional 
arrangements of the multilateral framwork of liberalization of trade and services and of 
different regional agreements in place. Many thorough studies (Morner (2000), Gardener 
(2000) and Frankel, J.A. (1996)) analyse in depth this institutional arrangements so I shall 
limit myself in this paper to a simplified description of the most results of the GATS 
negotiations and of the main aspects pertinent to FFDI in each of the selected major RIAs. 
 
3- To evaluate how the type of RIA initiative may affect its impact on FDI in banking sector, 
we presents three case studies focusing on different kinds of regional integration : North-
North integration (Canada in CUSFTA), North-South integration (Mexico joining NAFTA), 
and South—South integration (MERCOSUR). The investment experiences in general and the 
financial one in particular of small, open economies are arguably more heavily influenced by 
international economic developments, such as regional integration, than those of relatively 
large economics (US and the major EU members countries). The choice of countries for the 
case studies has largely been conditioned by this consideration. 
                                                
3 Levy Yeyati, E., E. Stein and C. Daude (2004) 
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I. Regional Integration Agreements and FDI: theoretical considerations 
 
     Parallel to the movement of liberalization and universalization of the years 1980, one 
attended a multiplication of regional integration agreements which do not relate to any more 
from now on only countries of equal development. Indeed, North-South regional integration 
between industrialized countries and developing countries will introduce new stakes. 
 
1) Traditional explanations 
 
     To analyze the effects of economic integration or the impact of the agreements of regional 
integration on the economies of the countries partners, the economists have recourse mainly 
to the theory of the international trade and with the theory of the FDI. The theory of the trade 
international is interested in the effects of these agreements on the localization of the 
industrial activities and the distribution of the provisioning of the local markets by imports or 
local production. It is not interested in nationality of control of the activities nor moreover to 
the actors responsible for these exchanges (Dunning, 1997). It does not tackle the questions 
of property but primarily the question of knowing if the FDI and the trade are substitutable or 
complementary, and what determines the choices of the localization of the firms in a vast 
space integrated where the territories are put in competition. Since one has recourse to the 
theory of the IDE, are explicitly put the questions holding with the nature of the property 
according to whether it is national or foreign. “…, the theory of the FDI examines the impact 
of integration on the competitive advantages of the firms of various nationalities, the 
localization of the activities associated with these competitive advantages and the means by 
which these advantages are organized jointly with the possibilities of resources of the 
countries hosts” (Dunning, 1997). In the theoretical analyses of the impacts of the FDI, one 
often finds one combination of the two approaches. 
 
 The impacts of the RIAs forward by several vectors. On the one hand, they will be positive 
for the FDI coming from the outside of the zone (outsiders) but have unforeseeable effects 
for the intra-regional FDI (Blömstrom and Kokko, 1997). In this last case, all depends on the 
nature of the FDI and thus of the strategies of the firms. Within the framework of the 
installation of the single market, Dunning (1997) highlighted in the case of the EU who the 
extra community IDE had been more important during the first phase of integration. 
 
Within the framework of the relations between developed countries and developing 
countries, those things are relatively different bus the types of exchanges are them even 
different. Indeed, the movements of FDI which integrated the developing countries 
traditionally were rather of vertical nature whereas since the Eighties, they are also of 
horizontal determined by the attraction of foreign markets in growth. In addition, the 
requirement of flexibility and reactivity at the markets which had caused phenomena of re- 
localization seems to move back in front of requirements of lightening of costs in a context 
where competition becomes sharper on certain markets because of rise to power of China. 
These transformations thus induced a change in the relative importance of the various 
determinants traditional of the FDI. Thus, the wage costs are more one determining 
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fundamental only for certain traditional sectors or in the sector of the services. The factorial 
equipments also moved back in front of the specific factors. The essential determinants 
become the importance of the investment in R-D, the accessibility to the new markets, the 
size of the markets, the proximity which allows the production in tended flows, the specific 
human capital, the quality of the infrastructure, transport and the means of 
telecommunications and ‘offer of local coordinations’.  
 
2)  The role of the institutions 
 
         However, it is noted that beside the traditional determinants, the institutional proximity 
between the countries of origin and the host countries count independently of the level of the 
GDP per capita generally regarded as a determining factor of the attractivity. However, the 
traditional approaches do not take into account the production of standards, rules, procedures 
of decision and institutional levelling implementations in the contemporary forms of regional 
integration between countries with different level of development. In the same way, certain 
historical aspects concerning the relations between member countries of the emergent RIA in 
the field of the trade and the FDI before the signature of the agreement seem to play an 
important part in the decisions of localization once agreement is signed. It is about a whole of 
variables of non-commercial nature that certain authors gather under the term of proximities 
and that others will gather under the term of “good governorship”. All things being equal in 
addition, in terms of size of market, competitiveness cost etc, offering countries of the 
proximities in terms of language, of mode of organization of the productive systems, 
commercial practices of negotiation, whose elites were formed in the same university 
structures will have more motivations to widen their co-operation in the industrial and 
commercial field via the IDE.  
        Relations between country of the zone in the field of the trade and the IDE before 
signature of the agreement thus play an important part in the decisions post-agreement. 
Indeed, the agreement reinforces or comforts the confidence of the investors who already 
have (or which had) interests in the countries in question. This idea that the history counts in 
the analysis of the effects of the regional integration agreements makes necessary to study 
stocks of IDE before and to put them in relation to the origin and the destination of flows. In 
spite of the diversity of the historical trajectories, one often observes a similarity between the 
institutions of the old countries administrators and the young emergent countries which 
remained to them bound by privileged trade. The transfer of politico-administrative models 
of organization often set up after independence allowed a diffusion of the modes of operation 
of the various public and private organizations. For example, in a sector-key as that of the 
bank, parallel to the various financial reforms, the effects of training of the banking 
executives in the structures of the French banks be via the systems of continuous training 
which were attached with the CFPB4, made it possible to preserve and to diffuse the French 
model of organization and operation in south-Mediterranean countries that were signed a 
bilateral integration agreements. In parallel, the plans of structural adjustment, the rules of 
WTO, the conditions of levelling and the installation “of a good governorship” take part 
jointly with the agreements of Barcelona in the construction of an institutional environment 
similar to that of the developed countries. Association at the EU is accompanied at the same 
                                                
4 Centre de formation de la profession bancaire, structure française de la formation continue spécialisée dans la banque 
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time by financial and institutional transfers because each of the Eastern and south countries 
of the Mediterranean must develop its capacity to be reformed. The system of conditionality 
of the IMF and the World Bank within the framework of the plans of structural adjustment 
are taken again by the EU. Beyond the re-establishment of macro-economic balance, certain 
countries must still look further into their structural reforms and thus continue privatizations, 
the reform of the financial system, the fight against corruption etc. Even if the requirements 
are not the same ones as for the candidates with integration in the EU, stowing in Europe 
implies certain numbers institutional transfers with an aim of improving the economic 
environment of the Eastern and south countries of the Mediterranean. The institutions must 
offer an attractive framework, controlled, sure, compatible with the standard framework of 
reference of the market economies. This framework defining it what must be “a good quality 
of institutions ” includes the tax system, the facility to create a company, the absence of 
corruption, the transparency and the accessibility to information, the protection of the rights 
of ownership, the effectiveness of justice, the laws contractual, the prudential standards, a 
competing framework, etc. More the institutions of the transmitting countries and the 
receiving countries of FDI are close, more them flows of FDI will be important 
independently of the level of the GDP per capita. This proximity institutional built has as an 
important effect if not more as the simple proximity geographical.  
 
         If the regional integration of a developing country at a developed zone (South-North 
RIA) enables him in certain cases to increase the possibilities of correction, especially in 
terms of institutional and organisational standards, and to reduce the cumulative effects of the 
initial divergences between the two zones, it also causes to offer to the foreign investors new 
profit opportunities. The FDI tend to be directed more naturally towards the developing 
countries integrated in a RIA than towards the others (Jaumotte, 2004).  
 
         This type of integration thus produces a certain number of consequences on creation, 
the orientation or the reorientation of flows of IDE towards certain countries of the RIA 
member which concluded from the horizontal agreements resulting in' widening their market. 
The agreements of Barcelona which followed upon the agreement of Marrakech signed in 
April 1994 will make it possible the countries of the EU to operate a correction in terms of 
North-South regionalization compared to the other large poles of the triad. For the countries 
of the South, these agreements contribute to increase their attractivity, goal of all the 
industrial policies of the Nineties. 
 
         However, if the stress is laid on the capacity to attract FDI, one should not therefore to 
occult that for certain countries of the south, the FDI are not a phenomenon recent. However, 
the innovation lies at the same time in the change of the international institutional 
environment which tends to be homogenized and in the evolution of the strategies of the 
firms. At the same time total and regional institutional changes (adoption of common 
standards and widening of the field of competition) and nationals (liberalization, 
deregulation, privatization) created new opportunities in a world more open and made up of 
heterogeneous zones from the point of view of the level of development. Indeed, if the firms 
established in certain south countries during period 1920-1960 hoped to control their sources 
of provisioning, to feed the local markets and to produce at low cost to export towards the 
markets of the north counties, those which invest in the south countries at the end of the 
Nineties and during years 2000 have strategies of repositioning within the framework of a 
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widened integrated regions with several countries but also strategies of control of certain 
activities on a world market scale. 
II. The liberalization of FFDI at the multilateral and regional level 
 
        In this section I will not study in depth the institutional arrangements of the multilateral 
framework of liberalization of trade and services and of the different regional agreements in 
place5. I shall limit the description here to the most salient results of the GATS negotiations, 
in first on the basis of an index of restrictions which was computed using the GATS 
schedules only and in the second on the basis of an index of restrictions which was provided 
using a large number of sources and included several different types of restrictions (Golub 
2003, 2006). The second part of this section is devoted to a brief description of the main 
aspects pertinent to FFDI in each of the RIAs (CUSFTA, NAFTA and MERCOSUR) 
covered in this paper. 
 
1) The multilateral liberalization of the financial services 
 
        Many of WTO members that participated in the Uruguay round trade negotiations made 
some specific commitments in financial services. Under GATS service sectors were bound in 
four different modes of supply: Mode 1 : Cross - border supply, whereby consumers or 
financial institutions in one country are allowed to take a loan abroad or purchase securities 
from foreign banks located abroad supplying the service across the border; Mode 2: 
Consumption abroad, in which a country allows its consumers to purchase services abroad 
from a foreign supplier; Mode 3: Commercial presence, whereby a country allows, for 
example, the establishment of foreign banks in its territory; and Mode 4 which covers the 
supply of services through the presence of natural persons of a country in the territory of 
another country. 
         On the basis of the individual countries commitments Qian (2000) calculated an index 
of financial liberalization for the different modes of market access negotiated under GATS. It   
shows in practice bindings were more restrictive for mode 1, probably because countries are 
reluctant to allow foreign service providers to enter their markets to provide services without 
being able to monitor them. In contrasts, most countries, and especially developing countries, 
have liberalized mode 3 (commercial presence). Indeed, countries like Chile, Argentina, 
South Africa or Mexico, have made far more liberal commitments than the EU or the USA. 
National policies, thus, seem to be have been geared towards attracting foreign banks and 
particularly so among emerging markets. 
 
            However, Golub (2003) and (2006) mentioned that the GATS schules by themselves 
are poor guides to the stance of policies towards FDI for most countries and generally 
underestimate the extent to which countries have opened up their financial service sector to 
FDI. While taking into account several different types of restrictions, such as limitations on 
foreign ownership, screening or notification procedures, management restrictions, and 
operational restrictions, he provides a study contains a more comprehensive and up-to-date 
compilation, quantifications and analysis of restrictions on FDI in banking services in 
                                                
5 See for example Empel and Mörner (2000), Gardener(2000) and Frankel,J.A. (1996) 
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developing and developed countries. As the banking FDI restrictions scores shows the most 
open developing countries tend to be in Latin American and Central and Eastern Europe. 
East, South-East and West Asia tend to be more restrictive (see annex Table 3). 
 
2) Regional Integration Agreements 
 
          CUSFTA is the 1988 Canadian-US free trade agreement, which lifted many entry 
barriers to the provision of financial services between the two countries. 
          The essence of the CUSFTA was the phased bilateral elimination of tariffs. In addition, 
a number of provisions reduced discrimination against bilateral foreign direct investment, 
including the extension of rights-of-establishment and national treatment. A range of 
prominent sectors, such as basic telecommunications, was effectively excluded from 
coverage under the investment liberalization provisions of the Agreement. Moreover, 
Canada's existing foreign investment screening procedures were left in place (see Annex 
table 2: Restrictions scores). Nevertheless, the thrust of the investment provisions of the 
CUSFTA was clearly to expand the legal scope for bilateral direct investment. Moreover, the 
inclusion of a relatively robust dispute resolution procedure arguably reduced the risks of 
either government acting in a discriminatory manner towards investors from the other 
country. 
 
          NAFTA is signed by Canada, Mexico and the United States and entered into force in 
January 1994. Like the EU, NAFTA explicitly considers the liberalization of financial 
services but, unlike the European agreement, NAFTA keeps the supranationality at a 
minimum, relying rather on working groups to deal with different issues of economic 
integration. The Financial Committee supervises the functioning of the agreement and there 
is a dispute settlement mechanism specific to financial services. A non complying party may 
have its benefits in the financial sector suspended.  
           Since CUSFTA had already liberalized financial services between Canada and the 
United States, the largest impact of NAFTA was to be for Mexico. Concerns regarding the 
Mexican banks' ability to withstand open competition from US and Canadian banks resulted 
in a delayed schedule for the opening of the Mexican financial system. The country was 
allowed to maintain share limits during a transitional period ending in 2000, when US and 
Canadian banks were to be allowed in an unrestricted way. The peso crisis of 1994 however, 
accelerated the financial reform in Mexico. As a standard response to him the government, 
encouraged by the international financial institutions, accelerated financial liberalization and 
to recapitalise banks with the help of foreign investors. In the aftermath of the crisis, the 
Mexican authorities were forced to intervene many banks that could not continue to operate 
as solvent entities (see Pablo Graf 1999 for a detailed description of the crisis and the ensuing 
reforms of the Mexican banking sector). The lack of domestic resources to re-capitalize the 
industry led the authorities to lift some restrictions on the foreign ownership of banks. 
 
           MERCOSUR Signed between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay in 1991 the 
Mercosur treaty aimed at, and accomplished, the establishment of a customs Union in 1995. 
The institutional structure of Mercosur was defined by the Ouropreto protocol in 1994. In 
1997 services were incorporated into the free trade area. Regarding regulation, Mercosur 
allows member countries to negotiate bilaterally mutual recognition in the financial sector.   
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         However, the most important changes with regard to financial liberalization had taken 
place at the national level and most were undertook before the start of the multilateral 
liberalization at least in Argentina and Brazil. The introduction of the convertibility plan in 
1991 marked a turning point in the Argentina's economic history. 'It heralded profound 
monetary and fiscal reform, broad deregulation of domestic markets, privatization of a 
majority of government owned entities, trade liberalization, elimination of capital controls 
and, more generally, a macroeconomic environment conducive to foreign investment' 
(Dages, Goldberg and Kinney 2000). Later, in the wake of the Mexican crisis of 1995 which 
severely tested the Argentinean financial system, financial sector reform was accelerated and 
foreign banks were permitted to play an important role in re-capitalizing the banking system. 
          In the case of Brazil a major process of structural change was triggered by the 
introduction of the Real Plan in July 1994 (see for a detailed description of the banking 
reforms in Brazil Geraldo Maia 1999). Hyperinflation was curved and a process of financial 
sector restructuring ensued whereby the number of operating banks was largely reduced and 
the state owned banks were privatized. As in the Argentinean case, contagion from the 
Tequila crisis put significant pressure on the Brazilian financial system, forcing the 
government to speed up the process of bank restructuring and to call in foreign banks to help 
with the re-capitalization of the system. To facilitate the entry of external institutions, the 
restriction that the minimum capital for a foreign bank had to be twice as large as that 
required for a national bank was eliminated in the late 1990s. 
III. Empirical study of regional integration and FDI in banking sector:    
three distinct cases of agreements 
 
         The theoretical discussion concluded that it is difficult to make general predictions 
regarding the results of RIAs on foreign direct investment decisions in banking sector. The 
response to an integration agreement will depend on the significance and nature of 
environmental change brought about by the RIA and the locational advantage of the country 
or region in question. Consequently, effects are likely to vary between small and large 
countries, developed and developing countries, and different integration agreements. 
          In this section, we will attempt to assess how the type of RIA will affect its impact on 
the location of foreign banking investment and, to cover several different integration kinds, 
we have chosen to examine the effects of three distinct cases of regional integration 
agreements: 
· North-North integration agreement, as illustrated by the impact of the CUSFTA on Canada, 
· North-South integration agreement, focusing on Mexican participation in the NAFTA, and 
· South-South integration agreement, exemplified by the establishment of the MERCOSUR. 
 
1) North-North integration agreement : Canada in CUSFTA 
 
           To the extent that CUSFTA significantly liberalized the North American trade 
environment, one would expect to see bilateral trade between the United States and Canada 
becoming relatively more important from 1988 onward. Moreover, to the extent that trade 
and foreign direct investment are significantly related - either as substitutes, as suggested by 
models of tariff-jumping FDI, or as complements, as implied by internalization theories - one 
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would also expect to see changes in the relative importance of bilateral direct investment in  
general and in banking sector between the two countries. 
 
 
 
Table1. FDI in banking sector of Canada (1995-2005) 
Table shows the share of assets (as a percentage of total banking sector assets) held by foreign banks* from US and from other countries.  
 
 Year Domestic Foreign US Other 
1995 95,9 4,1 0,10 4,00 
1996 95,3 4,7 0,12 4,58 
1997 95,7 4,3 0,13 4,17 
1998 94,8 5,2 0,11 5,09 
1999 94,6 5,4 0,12 5,08 
2000 93,9 6,1 0,13 5,98 
2001 93,5 6,5 0,17 6,33 
2002 92,9 7,1 0,14 6,96 
2003 92,3 7,7 0,18 7,52 
2004 91,7 8,3 0,16 8,14 
2005 91,9 9,1 0,15 8,95 
 
* A foreign bank is defined to have at least 50 % foreign ownership 
   Data source: BankScope database 
 
           Table 1 presents an overview of the foreign direct investment in Canadian bank 
system between 1995 and 2005. Certainly there is no consistent evidence of any lasting 
diversion of US banks penetration to Canada in response to CUSFTA. However our 
observations suggest a concurrent increase in the banks’ foreign direct investments from the 
rest of the world, presumably because the CUSFTA made Canada a more attractive 
investment location for outsiders firms and thus for banks that follow their customers.  
          Canada offers a potentially instructive case study of the impacts of a RIA on foreign 
direct investment flows for a small open economy. Since economic theory makes no 
compelling case for a strong linkage between RIAs and FDI patterns for individual countries, 
and since the environmental change connected with the CUSFTA was not dramatic, on the 
one hand it is hardly surprising that the pattern of US banks' foreign direct investment into 
Canada over the past years does not suggest a strong and consistent influence of the 
agreement. On the other, it seems reasonable to characterize the Canadian position with 
moderate changes resulting from the agreement. In this context, it should be remembered that 
bilateral trade between Canada and the US had been substantially liberalized well before the 
event studied here, through successive GATT rounds as well as special bilateral agreements 
such as the Auto Pact and the Defense Sharing Agreement. Thus one can not attend a rather 
important “institutional proximity built” within the framework of the new agreement 
(CUSFTA) and which will normally have like answer an increase of the foreign bank 
entry(Claessens S. and Neeltje Van Horen (2006)) , institutional convergence between the 
two countries already exists before the agreement. Hence, we should expect relatively 
moderate US banks’ direct investment effects of the agreement for Canada. 
           Nevertheless, the Canadian experiences serve as a caution against anticipating 
substantial banks’ foreign direct investment impacts for smaller economies joining RIAs and 
especially in the case of the North-North integration agreement. 
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2) North-South integration agreement : Mexico in NAFTA 
 
           Since CUSFTA had already liberalized financial services between Canada and the 
United States, the largest impact of NAFTA was to be for Mexico. 
 
           The share of assets held by foreign banks in Mexico has dramatically increased, from 
2,3 percent 1995 to over 83 percent in 2005, as shown in table 2. The North American assets 
share in Mexican foreign banks assets has also grown over this period, but not quite as 
dramatically. The reason to expect positive implications of the free trade arrangement for the 
Mexican economy is related to the significant policy changes that have taken place in recent 
years. Traditionally, Mexico has been a closed economy. In the mid-1980s, however, 
important market-oriented reforms were introduced in several sectors, and the economy 
began to open up. As a consequence of the NAFTA, the reform process has been”locked in” 
and extended to many sectors, such as finance. The reforms themselves were fostered by the 
general climate favouring privatization, deregulation and reliance on market mechanisms, the 
gradual erosion of the effectiveness of and policy support for capital account regulation, and 
the influence of international financial institutions in promoting greater integration into the 
global economy and more robust domestic financial systems.  
 
           The coincidence of policy reforms, institutional convergence towards international 
standards and distinct locational advantages in the form of free access to serve a substantial 
part of the Canadian and US markets, make the Mexican banking sector very attractive for 
the foreign penetration from insiders and outsiders of the RIA member. In addition, it is quite 
clear that foreign multinationals have noted and reacted on the recent changes in Mexico. To 
the extent that Mexico has become a relatively more important supplier to the US market 
through trade creation or trade diversion, foreign multinationals are likely to respond by 
increasing their implantation in Mexico, what will have as a consequence an increase of the 
entry of foreign banks that follow their firms’ customers.  
 
 
Table2. FDI in banking sector of Mexico 
Table shows the share of assets (as a percentage of total banking sector assets) held by foreign banks in Mexico. 
 
 Year Domestic Foreign NAFTA* Other 
1995 97,7  2,3  1,2 1,1 
1996 95,5  4,5  1,4 3,1 
1997 92,7  7,3  2,1 5,2 
1998 92,4  7,6  2,7 4,9 
1999 89,9  10,1  3,9 6,2 
2000 71,3  28,7  8,3 20,4 
2001 69,7  30,3  10,1              20,2 
2002 38,2  61,8  20,2 41,6 
2003 37,3   62,7  21,5 41,2 
2004 32,8  67,2  23,7 43,5 
2005 16,7  83,3  24,9 58,4 
  
* Other NAFTA’s member; Canada and USA 
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Data source: Bank Scope database 
 
          The experience of Mexico suggests that North-South integration may be greatly 
beneficial for the Southern partners, and illustrates some of the prerequisites for achieving 
these beneficial effects. Firstly, membership in the NAFTA coincided with other reforms that 
liberalized the institutional framework of the country. Hence, the RIA contributed to a very 
significant institutional proximity and a positive environmental change. Secondly, Mexico 
possesses strong locational advantages with respect to its northern neighbours. These are 
made up of increasingly market oriented economic policies, and geographical proximity. 
Consequently, regional integration has been connected to significant increases in the level of 
foreign banks investment, in particular from countries outside the NAFTA region. In other 
words, Mexico is a good example of a country that would be classified in level 1 in our 
template of possible outcomes of regional integration agreements. 
 
3) South-South integration agreement : MERCOSUR 
 
Table3. Foreign Direct Investment Banking Sector of MERCOSUR members 
Table shows the share of assets (as a percentage of total banking sector assets) held by foreign banks. 
 
Year Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay 
1995 25,4  8,9  69,4  24,3  
1996 29  9,8  56,3  14,2  
1997 37,1 14,7  74  18,3  
1998 40,1  15,3  76,7  25,1  
1999 39,4  17,8  77,4  30,7  
2000 48,2  26,9  79,8  32,4  
2001 44,4  30,3  80,7  35,5  
2002 37,8  28,9  81,2  34,2  
2003 38,4  27,4  83,4  40,1  
2004 40,1  27,7  83,6  42,8  
2005 42,5  28,1 84,4 50,2  
Source: BankScope database 
 
           First, these aggregate data do not distinguish between intra and inter-regional foreign 
bank participation, but the dominate share of the North banks assets in total foreign assets, 
shown in table 4, suggest that a significant share of the banking FDI com from outside the 
MERCOSUR. So the additional effect of this RIA does not seem to have taken place at the 
expense of the share of foreign banks assets from the rest of the world. 
 
Table4. Share South banks assets*, versus share North banks assets on total foreign Assets of 
MERCOSUR member (in percent) 
 Argentina Brazil Paraguay Uruguay 
Share South banks 
assets in total 
foreign assets 
0,02 0,01 0,20 0,20 
Share North banks 
assets in total 
foreign assets 
0,98 0,99 0,80 0,80 
Share South foreign 0,17 0,07 0,44 0,24 
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banks in total 
foreign banks 
 
* South banks assets were assets of foreign banks (average over 2000-2004) from all developing countries including other MERCOSUR 
member 
   Source: Neeltje Van Horen (2006) 
  
           Second, the dramatically increase of foreign banks entry to the region between 1995 
and 2005, shown in table 3, was not of an equal level to all participating countries. 
           Argentina registered a very large increase in foreign banks’ direct investment since 
1995, and there is reason to expect that much of this was unrelated to the regional integration 
process. The most important attraction for foreign banks investors was arguably Argentina’s 
comprehensive privatization program, which opened not only financial service but also 
several public service industries to foreign investment. Another important determinant was 
the country’s successful macroeconomic reforms, which managed to bring down public 
deficits, inflation, and interest rates, and ensured the convertibility of the currency. 
            The foreign banks investment in Brazil has increased widely during the past years, 
and the share of foreign banks participation remains even less important than in Argentina, 
although the Brazilian market is about four times larger. One reason is that market-oriented 
reforms were introduced later and macroeconomic stabilization was achieved later in Brazil 
than in the other countries in the region. Consequently, the positive prospects connected with 
regional integration were tempered by an unpredictable macroeconomic environment. 
However, the recent years have witnessed successful reforms and stabilization in Brazil as 
well and the foreign banks assets have increased markedly and reached over 27 percent of the 
total Brazilian banks assets. Other reason is the strong locational advantages of Brazil in 
terms of its large market; suggest that we should expect substantial inflows of real foreign 
investment and as a consequence an increase of the entry of foreign banks that follow their 
firms’ customers.  
           The experiences of the two smaller countries in the region, Paraguay and Uruguay, are 
mixed. While in the two cases the share of foreign banks seems to have increased, there is no 
similar source of foreign participation. Uruguay is arguably more attractive for extra-bloc 
investors because of its geographical location between Brazil and Argentina and as a 
consequence more attractive for the north foreign banks that follow their firms’ customers 
(table 4 shown that the share of south foreign banks in total foreign banks is only 24 percent). 
The smallest country of the Agreement, Paraguay, has benefited from intra-bloc banking FDI 
if not from foreign banks’ direct investment from the rest of the world. The locational 
advantages of Paraguay are weaker for extra-bloc banking investors and especially for north 
investors but still important for the intra-bloc banking investors that search to profit from the 
“first-mover advantage” which can be provides by the access to preferential market. 
 
Conclusions and directions for future research 
 
          The economic theory does not provide any general prediction regarding the impact of 
RIAs on foreign banks’ investment decision. A difficulty in assessing this role is that there 
are many channels through which RIAs could potentially have an impact on the banking FDI.  
For instance, the impact of a RIA may be affected by its type. The effects of agreements 
between developed countries (North-North RIAs) may differ from integration between 
developing countries (South-South RIAs) or agreements between countries at different levels 
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of development (North-South RIAs), depending on how competitive the domestic bank 
system is, how much an institutional proximity is construct by the agreements, and how 
much integrating there is at the outset. Regional integration is likely to have different effects 
on investors from the participating economies and outside investors, particularly if the 
agreements are discriminatory in the sense that significant barriers against the rest of the 
world remain after regional trade and investment are opened up. Hence, specifying the exact 
relation between RIAs’ type and banking FDI is essentially an empirical question. 
 
            The three cases presented in the second part of the paper highlighted some of the 
cross-country differences in the foreign banking investment effects of regional integration. 
The first case focused on the Canadian participation in the CUSFTA, and illustrated a 
situation where the RIA did not appear to cause any radical changes in the US banks’ entry to 
the country in question. The main reasons for the moderate impact of the CUSFTA are 
probably that the environmental change connected with the agreement was not dramatic 
(since trade between Canada and the US was already relatively free due to GATS 
commitments and various bilateral treaties) and that there was already institutional proximity 
who results in considerable cross-investment between the two countries in banking sector.  
 
            The second case examined the impact of the NAFTA agreement on foreign banks’ 
investment in Mexico, and suggested that this specific RIA has had a profound impact on the 
share of foreign banks assets in total banks assets. There are several reasons for this impact. 
Firstly, the establishment of the NAFTA coincided with and deepened other reforms that 
liberalized the institutional framework of the country. Hence, the agreement contributed to 
very significant and positive environmental changes. Secondly, due to its increasingly market 
oriented economic policies and geographical proximity, Mexico possesses strong locational 
advantages. Consequently, regional integration has created an abundance of new commercial 
opportunities for domestic and foreign investors, in the domestic Mexican market as well as 
in the US and Canadian markets. The response has been a significant increase in the foreign 
bank direct investment inflows, in particular from countries outside the NAFTA region and 
in particular that which follow their firms’ customers. The Mexican experience is likely to 
capture some general characteristics of North-South agreements, primarily related to the 
potential for improved policy credibility and gains from guaranteed access to large northern 
markets. 
            In the case the Mercosur, the combined effect of national policies and the regional 
agreement has meant a significant increase of foreign bank entry from all sources in 
Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. The smallest country of the Agreement, Paraguay, has 
benefited from intra-bloc banking FDI if not from banking FDI from the rest of the world. 
 
             The case studies methodology has the advantage that one can take into account the 
institutional detail of the countries under study when reaching conclusions about the impact 
of integration on FDI. At the same time, however, it illustrates the difficulty of drawing 
strong conclusions when so many other variables complicate the particular cases. In 
Mercosur, for example, it is hard to disentangle the effect of the RIA from that of 
macroeconomic stabilization, which occurred at approximately the same time. In Mexico, the 
effect of NAFTA is hard to distinguish from that of other changes in FDI-related policies that 
took place. Moreover, the particular circumstances of each of the cases studied make it 
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difficult to extrapolate the findings to other potential RIAs, particularly when these do not 
share the same context even if it is of the same kind. To what degree was banking FDI 
influenced by the unique circumstances of each set of countries and to what degree was it 
driven by their RIA type? Case studies, however well informed, cannot provide definitive 
answers. Another way to proceed, which provides a nice complement to the case studies, is 
to control for some of those circumstances within a large sample of developed and developing 
countries all of which are sources or hosts of FDI, and are parties to several kinds of RIAs to 
try to sort out quantitatively the effects of an RIA from the effects of other circumstances. 
 
 
                                                                Annex 
Table1: Selected Major Regional Integration Agreements  
RIA Members 
Industrial and developing 
Economies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
European Union (EU): formerly European Economic Community (EEC) and European Community, 1957: 
Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands; 1973: Denmark, Ireland, 
United Kingdom; 1981: Greece; 1986: Portugal, Spain; 1995: Austria, Finland, Sweden. 
European Economic Area: 1994: EU, Iceland, Liechtenstein, And Norway. 
Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area (Euro-Maghreb): Bilateral agreements, 1995: EU and Tunisia; 1996: EU 
and Morocco. 
EU bilateral agreements with Eastern Europe: 1994: EC and Hungary, Poland; 1995: European Community and 
Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Slovenia. 
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Area: 1988: Canada, United States. 
North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA): 1994: Canada, Mexico, United States. 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC): 1989: Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, United States; 1991: China, 
Hong Kong (China), Taiwan (China); 1993: Mexico, Papua New Guinea; 1994: Chile; 1998: Peru, Russia, And 
Vietnam. 
 
Andean Pact: 1969: revived in 1991, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela. 
Central American Common Market (CACM): 1960: revived in 1993, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua; 1962: Costa Rica. 
Southern Cone Common Market (Mercado Común del Sur—MERCOSUR): 1991: Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, 
Uruguay. 
Group of Three: 1995: Colombia, Mexico, And Venezuela. 
Latin American Integration Association (LAIA): formerly Latin American Free Trade Area, 1960: revived 1980, 
Mexico, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM): 1973: Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Jamaica, St. 
Kitts and Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago; 1974: Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines; 1983: The Bahamas (part of the Caribbean Community but not of the Common Market). 
 
Cross-Border Initiative: 1992: Burundi, Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
East African Cooperation: 1967: formerly East African Community broke up in 1977 and recently revived Kenya, 
Tanzania, and Uganda. 
Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa: 1994: formerly Union Douanière et Economique de 
l’Afrique Centrale, 1966: Cameron, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Gabon; 1989: Equatorial Guinea. 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): 1975: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo. 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa: 1993: Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
Indian Ocean Commission: 1984: Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles. 
Southern African Development Community (SADC): 1980: formerly known as the Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference, Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe; 1990: Namibia; 1994: South Africa; 1995: Mauritius; 1998: Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Seychelles. 
Economic Community of West Africa: 1973: revived in 1994 as West African Economic and Monetary Unit, 
Benin, Burkino Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal. 
West African Economic and Monetary Union: 1994: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, 
Togo, 1997: Guinea-Bissau. 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU): 1910: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland. 
Economic Community of the Countries of the Great Lakes: 1976: Burundi, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of the 
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Middle East and Asia 
 
 
 
 
 
Congo. 
 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): 1967: ASEAN Free Trade Area was created in 1992, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand; 1984: Brunei Darussalam; 1995: Vietnam; 1997: Myanmar, Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic; 1999: Cambodia. 
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): 1981: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates. 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation: 1985: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, 
Sri Lanka. 
Source: WTO data. 
 
Table 2: Equity restrictions and government ownership in banking services of selected 
countries, 2004 or latest available year 
 
Country Restrictions scores * Permissible foreign share 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Canada  
Mexico 
Paraguay  
Uruguay  
USA 
0,100 
0,430 
0,575 
0,350 
0,150 
0,600 
0,150 
No restrictions 
50%- 99% 
1% - 49% 
50%- 99% 
No restrictions 
1% - 49% 
No restrictions 
*See Table 3 for the system of notation used to calculate the total score of restrictivity in banking sector of each country. 
   Source: Golub, S. (2003) and (2006). 
  
Table 3 : Coefficients on FDI restrictions (Maximum 1.0) 
                                                                                                                                    
Type of restriction              Scores                                                                                                                      
 
Foreign equity limits 
    No foreign equity allowed                                                           
    1 to 19 % foreign equity allowed  
    20-34% foreign equity allowed  
    35-49 % foreign equity allowed 0.3 
    50-74% foreign equity allowed 0.2 
    75-99% foreign equity allowed 0.1 
     No restriction but unbound 
 Screening and approval 
     Investor must show economic benefits  
     Approval unless contrary to national interest  
     Notification (pre or post)  
Other restrictions 
     Board of directors/Managers 
          Majority must be nationals or residents  
          At least 1 must be national or resident  
          Must be locally licensed  
     Movement of people 
          No entry  
          Less than one year  
          One to two years  
          Three to four years  
     Input and operational restrictions 
          Domestic content must be more than 50% 
        Other 
Total* 
 
1 
0.6 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0.05 
 
0.2 
0.1 
0.05 
 
 
0.1 
0.05 
0.025 
 
0.1 
0.075 
0.05 
0.025 
 
0.1 
0.05 
 
Between 0 and 1 
 
 
* If foreign equity is banned, then the other criteria become irrelevant, so that the index is at 1.0. It is possible that various scores sum to slightly more 
than 1.0    when foreign equity is not totally banned, and in such cases, the index is capped at 1.0. 
Source: OECD, adapted from GOLUB, S. (2003). 
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